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The vulnerability of a national economy to volatility in the global 
markets for credit, currencies, commodities, and other assets has 
become a central concern of policymakers. The responsibility for 
managing these risks at the national level is often given to the central 
bank. However, the conventional models and analytical tools used by 
central banks today are ill suited for analyzing these types of risk. This 
paper proposes a new approach to improve the way central banks can 
analyze and manage the financial risks of a national economy. It is 
based on the modern theory and practice of Contingent Claims Analysis 
(CCA), which is successfully used today at the level of individual banks 
by managers, investors, and regulators. When applied to the analysis 
and measurement of credit risk, CCA is commonly called the Merton 
Model.1 The basic analytical tool is the risk-adjusted balance sheet, 
which shows the sensitivity of the enterprise’s assets and liabilities 
to external shocks. At the national level, the sectors of an economy 
are viewed as interconnected portfolios of assets, liabilities, and 
guarantees—some explicit and others implicit. Traditional approaches 
We would like to thank Sam Malone, Andrea Maechler, Chris Towe, Mark 
Swinburne, Matt Jones, John Kiff, Mark Levonian, and Joe Zou (Taconic) for useful 
discussions and comments on the ideas presented in the paper.
1. See Merton (1973, 1974, 1977, 1992, 1998). Initially developed for valuation of 
corporate firms, CCA has been adapted to financial institutions and sovereigns.
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have difficulty analyzing how risks can accumulate gradually and then 
suddenly erupt in a full-blown crisis. The CCA approach is well-suited 
to capturing such nonlinearities and quantifying the effects of asset-
liability mismatches within and across institutions. Risk-adjusted CCA 
balance sheets facilitate simulations and stress testing to evaluate 
the potential impact of policies to manage systemic risk.
The paper starts with a description of contingent claims analysis 
and then outlines a simple framework of CCA balance sheets for 
four key sectors (namely, the sovereign, financial, corporate, and 
household sectors). It describes how the sectoral CCA balance sheets 
can be constructed and linked together. Several different types of risk 
exposures and risk transmission channels are discussed. Finally, the 
paper shows how the CCA financial risk indicators can be used in 
stress testing, linked to macroeconomic and monetary policy model.
1. ConTingenT Claims analysis
A contingent claim is any financial asset whose future payoff 
depends on the value of another asset. The prototypical contingent 
claim is an option—the right to buy or sell the underlying asset at 
a specified exercise price by a certain expiration date. A call is an 
option to buy; a put is an option to sell. Contingent claims analysis 
is a generalization of the option pricing theory pioneered by Black 
and Scholes (1973) and Merton (1973). Since 1973, option pricing 
methodology has been applied to a wide variety of contingent claims. 
In this paper we focus on its application to the analysis of credit risk 
and guarantees against the risk of default. 
The contingent claims approach is based on three principles: the 
values of liabilities are derived from assets; liabilities have different 
priority (that is, senior and junior claims); and, assets follow a stochastic 
process. The liabilities consist of senior claims (such as senior debt), 
subordinated claims (such as subordinated debt), and junior claims 
(equity or the most junior claim). As total assets decline, the value of 
risky debt declines and credit spreads on risky debt rise. 
Balance sheet risk is the key to understanding credit risk and 
crisis probabilities. Default happens when assets cannot service 
debt payments. Uncertain changes in future asset value, relative to 
promised payments on debt, is the driver of default risk. Figure 1 
illustrates the key relationships. The uncertainty in asset value is 
represented by a probability distribution at time horizon T. At the 
end of the period, the value of assets may be above the promised 127 Measuring and Managing Macrofinancial Risk
payments, indicating that debt service can be made, or below the 
promised payments, leading to default. The area below the distribution 
in panel A of figure 1 is the “actual” probability of default. The asset-
return probability distribution used to value contingent claims is not 
the “actual” one but the “risk-adjusted” or “risk-neutral” probability 
distribution, which substitutes the risk-free interest rate for the actual 
expected return in the distribution. This risk-neutral distribution is 
the dashed line in panel B, with expected rate of return r, the risk-free 
rate. Thus, the risk-adjusted probability of default calculated using 
the risk-neutral distribution is larger than the actual probability of 
default for all assets that have an actual expected return (µ) greater 
than the risk-free rate r (that is, a positive risk premium).2 
The calculations of the actual probability of default is outside 
the CCA/Merton Model, but it can be combined with an equilibrium 
model of underlying asset expected returns to produce estimates that 
are consistent for expected returns on all derivatives, conditional on 
the expected return on the asset. The reason is that one does not 
have to know expected returns to use the CCA/Merton Models for 
the purpose of value or risk calculations.
The value of assets at time t is A(t). The asset return process is 
dA A A A dt t / = + µ σ ε , where µA is the drift rate or asset return, σA is 
equal to the standard deviation of the asset return, and ε is normally 
distributed, with zero mean and unit variance. The probability 
distribution at time T is shown in panel A of figure 1.
Default occurs when assets fall to or below the promised payments, 
Bt. The probability of default is the probability that At ≤ Bt which is 
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N(•) is the cumulative standard normal distribution. 
2. See Merton (1992, pp. 334–43, 448–50).128 Dale F. Gray, Robert C. Merton, and Zvi Bodie
Shown in panel B of figure 1 is the probability distribution 
(dashed line) with drift of the risk-free interest rate, r. The risk-














Box 1 presents the Merton Model equations. (See the appendix 
for more details, including extensions of the Merton Model.)
Figure 1. Asset Value and Probability of Default 
A. Asset value
B. Asset value and actual and risk-adjusted probability of default 
Source: Authors’ elaboration; adapted from Gray and Malone (2008).129 Measuring and Managing Macrofinancial Risk
Box 1. Merton Model Equations for Pricing 
Contingent Claims
The total market value of assets at any time, t, is equal to the market 
value of the claims on the assets, equity, and risky debt maturing at time T: 
Assets = Equity + Risky Debt,
A(t) = J(t) + D(t).
Asset value is stochastic and in the future may decline below the point 
at which debt payments cannot be made on scheduled dates. The equity 
can be modeled and calculated as an implicit call option on the assets, 
with an exercise price equal to the promised payments, B, maturing in 
T - t periods. The risky debt is equivalent in value to default-free debt 
minus a guarantee against default. This guarantee can be calculated as 
the value of a put on the assets with an exercise price equal to B:
Risky Debt = Default-Free Debt - Debt Guarantee,
D(t) = Be–r(T–t) - P(t).
We omit the time subscript at t = 0.
The value of the equity is computed using the Black-Scholes-Merton 
formula for the value of a call:
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where r is the risk-free rate, σA is the asset return volatility, and N(d) is the 
cumulative probability of the standard normal density function below d. 
The formula for the delta of the put option is N(d1)-1 . The yield to 







where D = Be–yT  and the credit spread is s = y - r.
The risk-neutral or risk-adjusted default probability is N(d2).
Example: Assuming that A = $100, σA = 0.40 (40 percent), B = $75, 
r = 0.05 (5%), and T = 1 (one year), the value of the equity is $32.37, 
the value of risky debt is $67.63; the yield to maturity on the risky debt 
is 10.34 percent, and the credit spread 5.34 percent. The risk adjusted 
probability of default is 26 percent.130 Dale F. Gray, Robert C. Merton, and Zvi Bodie
Financial fragility is intimately related to probability of default. 
Shocks to flows, prices, or liquidity frequently end up being converted 
into credit risk in a crisis. Default is hard to handle in traditional 
macroeconomic models, in part because the assumptions usually 
exclude the possibility of default. In addition, flow-of-funds accounts 
and accounting balance sheets cannot provide measures of risk 
exposure that are forward-looking estimates of losses. CCA is a 
framework that explicitly includes the probability of default.
2. ConTingenT Claim balanCe sheeTs foR seCToRs 
We view an economy as a set of interrelated balance sheets with 
four types of aggregate sectors—corporate, financial, household, 
and sovereign. The same general principles of contingent claims 
that apply to the analysis of a single firm can also be applied to an 
aggregation of firms. The liabilities of a firm, a portfolio of firms in 
a sector, or the sovereign (that is, the combined government and 
monetary authorities) can be valued as contingent claims on the 
assets of the respective firm or sector or sovereign. The corporate 
sector refers to an aggregation of all nonfinancial firms. Treating the 
corporate sector as one large firm and the financial sector as one large 
institution is a very simplified way of looking at the balance sheet, 
but we start out with this stylized framework to illustrate the risk 
characteristics of the sector for the purposes of this analysis. Later 
in the paper, we look at the major financial institutions separately 
and group the corporate firms into subsectors. The key elements 
of the balance sheets for the corporate, financial, household, and 
sovereign sectors are shown in table 1. 
2.1 Economywide Macroeconomic Contingent Claim 
Balance Sheets and Risk Exposures 
Building on the theory of contingent claims laid out above, the 
macrofinance valuation identities use put-call parity relationships, 
which state that the asset value A of each sector is equal to the value 
of its equity plus the value of its risky debt.3 The four primary sectors 
3. See Gray, Merton, and Bodie (2002) and Gapen and others (2004).131 Measuring and Managing Macrofinancial Risk
of the economy, for the corporate, financial, sovereign, and household 
balance sheets, are complemented by the foreign sector. The CCA 
balance sheet equations for each sector j have the sector assets equal 
to equity (that is, junior claims) plus risky debt. The function Ej refers 
to the period t value of sector j’s equity (that is, the junior claim), which 
is modeled as an implicit call option. The horizon period is T for the 
calculation of the implicit option values. Risky debt, Dj, is equal to the 
default-free value of the debt, denoted by B B B e
i i i
rT ( ) ≡
- , minus the 
value of the implicit put option, which is denoted by Pj (the expected 
losses associated with the debt). The time horizon T is the same for 
all sectors for the calculation of the CCA values at each point in time. 
Using the notation above, the following equations state the put-call-
parity relationships for the four domestic sectors. For the corporate 
sector (C ), assets, AC, equal equity, EC, plus the risky debt, B P C C - :
A E B P C C C C = + - ( ).
For the financial sector (F), assets, AF, plus contingent financial 
support from the sovereign, αPF, equals equity, EF, plus the value 
of risky debt/deposits, B P F F - - ( ) 1 α :
Table 1. Balance Sheets for the Corporate, Financial, 
Household, and Sovereign Sectors
Sector Assets Liabilities
Corporate Corporate assets Debt; equity
Financial Loans and other assets 
(including loans to corporations, 
households, and the sovereign); 
financial guarantees
Debt and deposits; equity
Household Household assets (including 
household income and savings in 
the form of deposits and other 
financial assets); Net worth in  
household real estate assets (on 
subsidiary balance sheet, which 
includes mortgage debt)
Household net worth (claim 
on household assets); 
consumption is a dividend 
payment out of assets 





Foreign currency reserves; net 
fiscal asset (present value of 
taxes minus expenditures); other 
public assets
Financial guarantees; 
foreign currency debt; base 
money; local currency debt
Source: Authors’ elaboration.132 Dale F. Gray, Robert C. Merton, and Zvi Bodie
A P E B P F F F F F + = + - - 
 
 α α ( ) , 1
where PF is the implicit put option to the financial sector.4 The model 
assumes that the government’s contingent liability, or the value of 
the explicit or implicit sovereign guarantee, is a fraction α of the total 
PF, and the remainder, (1-α)PF, is credit risk remaining in the debt 
and deposits of the financial sector.
For the sovereign, the assets of the sovereign, AS, include foreign 
currency reserves, RMA; the net fiscal asset, AG (defined as the present 
value of taxes and revenues, including seigniorage, minus the present 
value of government expenditures); and other public assets, AOther. 
The liabilities of the sovereign include base money, MBM, risky local 
currency debt ( ) B P SLC SLC - , risky foreign currency debt ( ) B P SFX SFX -  , 
and financial guarantees/contingent liabilities, αPF:
A R A A M B P B P P S MA G Other BM SLC SLC SFX SFX F = + + = + - + - + ( ) ( ) . α
For the household sector, the household asset, AH, is the sum of the 
household sector’s financial wealth, AFIN, the present value of its labor 
income, AL, and equity in real estate, EH,RE. The debt of households 
to banks and nonbanks is frequently tied to homes and real estate. 
It is therefore practical to have two segregated but linked household 
CCA balance sheets. The subsidiary balance sheet would have real 
estate as the primary asset, with related debt on the liability side.5 
The households’ equity in real estate is modeled as real estate assets, 
AH,RE, minus risky household mortgage related debt, B P H RE H RE , , - :
A A A E
A A A B P
E c
H FIN L H RE
FIN L H RE H RE H RE
H H
= + +





, , , ( )
.
The household sector asset, AH, is equal to the household net 
worth, EH, plus cH which is consumption modeled as a dividend 
payment out of the household asset up to time T.
4. Merton (1977) was the first to demonstrate that the government’s guarantee to 
banks could be modeled as an implicit put option.
5. This structure has many variations. Debt could be included on the main 
household balance sheet, or additional subsidiary balance sheets could be included 
relating specific debt obligations to related assets.133 Measuring and Managing Macrofinancial Risk
The four-sector CCA balance sheets can be integrated into an 
economywide balance sheet, as shown in table 2. For each sector, the 
assets, plus contingent assets (or minus contingent liabilities), minus 
equity and junior claims, and minus risky debt sum to zero (down 
the column in table 2). These interlinked economic balance sheets 
demonstrate the interdependence among sectors, with one sector 
long a certain implicit option (plus sign) and another sector short 
the same implicit option (minus sign). For example, the economic 
balance sheet of the banking sector has assets consisting of corporate 
loans (default-free debt minus the value of a put option). The banking 
sector also includes contingent liabilities (implicit put options) from 
the government as an asset, which is an obligation (short put option) 
on the government’s economic balance sheet.6 
Table 2. Economywide Contingent Claim Balance Sheet with 
Risk Exposures across Sectors (Implicit Put and Call Options)












-EC -EH -cD -EF -MBM -BSLC
+PSLC Foreign 
claims Barrier -BC -BF -BSFX
Expected loss (put) +PC +(1-αG)PF +PSFX
Sum 0 0 0 0 0
Source: Authors’ elaboration.
The financial assets of the sectors can be separated into claims 
on foreigners and claims on domestic entities. For simplicity, the 
detailed cross-holdings by the household sector, financial sector, and 
foreign sector on the other sectors are not shown in table 2. 
6. Macrofinancial risk models similar to this framework have been calibrated for 
over 20 countries (although only a few incorporate the household sector).134 Dale F. Gray, Robert C. Merton, and Zvi Bodie
2.2 Interrelationship of Macrofinancial Contingent 
Claim Balance Sheets, Risk Exposures, and Traditional 
Macroeconomic Flows
We now show how the traditional macroeconomic flow-of-funds 
account can be recovered from the CCA equations when risk goes to 
zero. When the volatility of assets in the CCA balance sheet equations 
(table 2) is set to zero, the values of the implicit put options go to 
zero.7 The result is the accounting balance sheet of the sectors. The 
flow of funds can thus be seen as a special deterministic case of 
the CCA balance sheet equations when volatility is set to zero and 
annual changes are calculated. The implicit put options in risky debt 
and contingent liabilities allow for risk to be transmitted between 
sectors in the CCA model. Without volatility, the risk transmission 
between sectors is lost. 
The combined accounts—that is, income/flow, mark-to-market 
balance sheets, and risk exposure measures—comprise the three 
important sets of interrelated accounts in the economy, which are 
somewhat similar to the accounts in large modern financial institutions.8 
Risk managers would find it difficult to analyze the risk exposure of their 
firm or financial institution by relying solely on the income and cash 
flow statements, without taking into account (mark-to-market) balance 
sheets or information on their institution’s derivative or option positions. 
Country risk analysis that relies only on a macroeconomic flow-based 
approach is deficient in a similar way, given that the traditional analysis 
does not take into account the volatility of assets. 
2.3 Measuring Implied Asset Value and Volatilities 
Using Market Prices
The market value of the assets of corporations, financial 
institutions, or sovereigns cannot be observed directly. However, the 
observed prices and volatilities of market-traded securities can be 
7. If the volatility of assets goes to zero, then in the put option formula 
N(–d1) = N(–d2) = 0, which means that the implicit put option values in the sectors 
go to zero. It is not possible to measure the expected loss and credit risk with asset 
volatility set to zero. Furthermore, if volatility goes to zero, then N(–d1) = N(–d2) = 1, 
and the value for the junior claim of the representative sector then reduces to the 
accounting net worth, equal to deterministic assets minus a measure of the book 
value of debt. See Gray and Malone (2008) for details.
8. Enterprise risk management is a framework to comprehensively measure and 
manage risk in firms and financial institutions. Its use has expanded in recent years.135 Measuring and Managing Macrofinancial Risk
used to estimate the implied values and volatilities of the underlying 
assets.9 These implied asset values and asset volatilities can be 
used to calibrate the pricing and risk model of major sectors in the 
economy. We discuss briefly how this can be done first for firms and 
financial institutions, then for the sovereign. 
2.3.1 Firms and financial institutions
Domestic equity markets provide pricing and volatility information 
for the calculation of implied assets and implied asset volatility in   
corporations and bank and nonbank financial institutions. The 
simplest method solves two equations for two unknowns, asset 
value and asset volatility. Details are shown in the appendix and in 
Merton (1974) and Crouhy, Galai, and Mark (2000). Moody’s KMV 
has successfully applied its version of the CCA model to measure the 
implied asset values and volatilities and to calculate expected default 
frequencies (EDFs) for over 50,000 firms and financial institutions 
in 55 countries around the world (Crosbie, 1999 and 2001). 
For unlisted corporates and banks, the relationship between the 
accounting information and the risk indicators of companies with 
traded equity can be used as a guide for mapping the accounting 
information  of  companies  without  traded  equity  to  default 
probabilities and risk indicators for institutions that do not have 
traded equity. An example is Moody’s RiskCalc for corporate sectors 
in many countries and for banks in the United States.
2.3.2 Sovereign
Since the market value of sovereign assets cannot be observed 
directly, a similar calibration procedure can be used for the sovereign 
balance sheet to estimate implied sovereign assets and asset 
volatility. The prices in the international markets (including the 
foreign currency market), together with information from domestic 
market prices, provide the market information for the value and 
volatility of certain liabilities on the sovereign balance sheet.10 If we 
subtract the financial guarantees from both sides of the sovereign 
balance sheet in the bottom rows in table 1, the remaining sovereign 
9. An implied value refers to an estimate derived from other observed data. 
Techniques for using implied values are widely practiced in options pricing and financial 
engineering applications. See Bodie and Merton (2000).
10. See Gray, Merton, and Bodie (2002 and 2006).136 Dale F. Gray, Robert C. Merton, and Zvi Bodie
liabilities are structured in a way that is consistent with the CCA 
framework. On the simplified sovereign balance sheet, the local 
currency debt of the government, held outside of the monetary 
authorities, and base money are local currency liabilities, which are 
modeled as a call option on the sovereign assets with the default 
barrier derived from the foreign currency debt. A simple two-claim 
CCA framework is used to calibrate the sovereign balance sheet by 
calculating implied sovereign assets,VSovereign, and asset volatility. 
This calibrated risk-adjusted balance sheet can be used to estimate 
credit risk in sovereign foreign currency and local currency debt, as 
well as other risk indicators. These indicators are robust measures 
of sovereign credit risk. 11 Scenarios and simulations can be carried 
out to evaluate the impact of fiscal and debt management policies 
and the impact of risk transfer onto the sovereign balance sheet. 
2.3.3 Household sector balance sheet
Modeling household balance sheets using CCA principles is much 
more difficult than for firms, financial institutions, or sovereigns. 
Households have no traded equity, so techniques that use equity to 
imply assets are not applicable. One alternative for constructing 
the household balance sheet is to use a bottom-up approach. In the 
household sector, we can use macroeconomic data and information 
from household surveys to construct measures of the portfolio of 
household assets directly, for the most part, and try to estimate 
the volatility of household assets directly. Household balance sheet 
assets include financial assets (such as pension assets, annuities, 
mutual funds, and bank deposits) and estimated labor income (that 
is, the present value of expected labor income) (see Gray and Malone, 
2008). For the household subsidiary balance sheet, direct estimation 
of the real estate prices, volatilities, and debt obligations is likely 
to be the most practical (but admittedly difficult) approach. Ideally. 
this analysis should be carried out not for the total household sector, 
but for households segmented by income groups.12 
11. Applications to a wide range of countries are described in Gapen and others 
(2004, 2008) and Gray, Merton, and Bodie (2007). Extensions for modeling the valuation 
of sovereign local-currency debt are described in Gray and Malone (2008) and Gray 
and others (2008).
12. It may be very difficult to model households in this way due to data limitations 
in many countries. CCA balance sheets for households are therefore not as accurate as 
the corporate or bank or sovereign CCA balance sheet models. 137 Measuring and Managing Macrofinancial Risk
2.4 Some Important Extensions and Refinements of 
CCA Models
Numerous extensions of the original Merton Model have been 
developed that relax certain assumptions in the original model. 
These extensions are described in more detail in the appendix, but 
two extensions are important to mention here. 
First, recent research studies the relationship between the 
volatility skew implied by equity options and credit default swap 
(CDS) spreads. Hull, Nelken, and White (2004) establish a relationship 
between the implied volatility of two equity options, leverage, and 
implied asset volatility. This approach is, in fact, another way of 
implementing Merton’s model to get spreads and risk-neutral default 
probabilities directly from the implied volatility of equity options. 
When the probability distributions derived from the option prices 
are negatively skewed (left tailed), then the implied underlying asset 
distribution is also negatively skewed, which results in a higher 
probability of assets being below the distress barrier and thus in 
higher spreads (Zou, 2003). In the sovereign CCA application, the 
probability distributions derived from foreign exchange option prices 
show that more negatively skewed foreign exchange distributions are 
associated with higher sovereign credit risk in emerging markets (see 
Gray, Merton, and Bodie, 2007). The CCA framework is thus able to 
link information from equity and foreign exchange options to credit 
risk and spreads. Financial stability reports usually look separately at 
credit risk indicators, probability distributions from option prices, and 
associated market sentiment indicators like the VIX. CCA provides a 
structural framework linking the option price information to skews 
in implied asset distributions and thus to credit risk. 
Second, the Merton Model has been extended to include stochastic 
interest rates. For example, Shimko, Tejima, and van Deventer (1993) 
include a Vasicek interest rate term structure model that allows interest 
rates and the term structure of interest rates to vary. This closed-form 
model, called the Merton-STV model, is a very useful extension that 
links the impact of changing interest rate levels, volatilities, and term 
structures to credit risk in financial institutions and corporations.
3. measuRing Risk exposuRes
So far, we have discussed how to calculate the value of risky 
debt, guarantees, and equity using the CCA approach. We now turn 
to how to measure the risk exposures. The values of the contingent 138 Dale F. Gray, Robert C. Merton, and Zvi Bodie
claims on the CCA balance sheets contain embedded implicit options 
that can be used to obtain certain risk measures. These include risk 
exposures in risky debt, probabilities of default, distance to distress, 
spreads on debt, the sensitivity of the implicit options to changes in 
the underlying asset, and other measures. The implicit put option 
increases nonlinearly as the market value of the sector’s assets 
decline.13 The delta measures this nonlinear change in the value of 
an option per unit change in the value of the underlying asset, as 
illustrated in figure 2.
Figure 2. Implicit Put Option Value and Deltaa
Source: Authors’ computation.
a. The strike price is 40; asset volatility is 40 percent.
For example, the government’s exposure to its guarantee to the 
banking sector can be measured with the delta of the banking sector 
implicit put option. There are other important sensitivity measures 
for risk exposures. The gamma is the change in the delta with respect 
to the underlying asset. The vega is the sensitivity of the change 
in the implicit option with respect to a change in asset volatility. 
These sensitivity measures of risk exposures could provide useful 
new indicators of the potential for financial instability.
13. See Draghi, Giavazzi, and Merton (2003).139 Measuring and Managing Macrofinancial Risk
3.1 Risk Transmission between Sectors 
The framework described above is versatile and can be used to 
understand many types of crises and risk shifting that cannot be 
easily analyzed with other techniques. The risk-transmission patterns 
can be dampened or magnified depending on the capital structure 
and linkages. The framework can help identify situations in which 
volatility gets magnified and negative feedback loops that can trigger 
severe crises. The patterns of value and default correlation across 
different asset classes, sectors, and sovereign debt values depend on 
these structures and links, which are unique to a particular economy. 
Below are some examples of risk transmission between sectors. 
3.1.1 Risk transmission from the corporate sector to the 
banking sector 
The corporate sector’s financial distress—possibly caused by 
stock market decline, recession, commodity price drops, or excessive 
unhedged foreign debt accompanied by currency devaluation—can 
be transmitted to the financial sector. As the value of the corporate 
sector’s assets declines, so does the value of its debt (and equity), which 
leads to a decline in bank assets and an increase in banking sector 
credit risk. The risk transfer can thus be diagramed as follows:
Corporate Sector   →   Banking Sector
The implicit put option in the banking sector derives its value 
from banking assets that have embedded put options in risky loans 
to the borrower. The household sector can similarly transmit risk 
to the banking sector. 
3.1.2 Risk transmission from the banking sector to the 
government
The banking sector’s financial distress, such as systemic banking 
crises or deposit runs, can be transmitted to the government by 
increasing the value of state guarantees, resulting in the following 
risk transfer: 
Banking Sector   →   Government140 Dale F. Gray, Robert C. Merton, and Zvi Bodie
Banking sector distress from nonperforming loans or a deposit 
run can result in a large increase in the government’s implicit 
guarantee.14
3.1.3 Risk transmission from the government to the banks 
and feedback
The government’s financial distress or default can transmit 
risk to the financial system. For example, when the banking sector 
is holding a significant proportion of government securities, and 
there is a negative shock to the government financial position, it 
can have a detrimental impact on the banks. The government’s 
implicit guarantee is also likely to increase. This, in turn, makes the 
government financial position even worse, which may result in the 
government’s failure to honor its guarantee obligations and cause a 
collapse of the banking system. 
Government   ↔   Banking/Financial System
 This vicious cycle could arise when the lower value of government 
securities reduces bank assets and raises the implicit financial 
guarantee, which, in turn, lowers government assets further. 
A similar process could occur if banks have significant lending 
denominated in foreign exchange and a weak government position 
causes a depreciation of the exchange rate: the depreciation worsens 
the position of the banks and thus raises the implicit guarantee, which 
then lowers government assets further. This means that the implicit 
guarantee is higher than what is shown above. In some situations, 
this vicious cycle can spiral out of control, eventually undermining 
the government’s ability to provide sufficient guarantees to banks 
and leading to a systemic financial crisis.
3.1.4 Risk transmission from the pension system to the 
government
Financial distress related to pension plans can result in the 
transmission of risk to the government:
Pension System   →   Government
14. See Merton and Bodie (1992).141 Measuring and Managing Macrofinancial Risk
We assume that the pension system is a defined benefit plan 
that has an implicit government guarantee. A decline in corporate 
assets would cause the corporate equity value to drop. This, in turn, 
increases the government guarantee to the pension system and the 
implicit guarantee to banks.15
3.1.5 Risk transmission from the sovereign to holders of 
sovereign debt
Fiscal, banking, and other problems can cause distress for the 
government, which can transmit risk to holders of government debt 
denominated in both foreign and local currencies: 
Sovereign   →   Sovereign Debt Holders 
Holders of foreign currency debt have a claim on the value of the 
debt minus the potential credit loss, which is dependent on the level 
of assets of the sovereign (in foreign currency terms) relative to the 
foreign currency default barrier. If debt holders demand higher spreads 
to cover the credit risk in government debt, then the interest rates on 
government debt could rise, leading to a depreciation. The associated 
feedback could further worsen the sovereign’s financial position. 
3.1.6 Risk transmission from the markets to households and 
consumption
Changes in the value of financial assets and real estate owned by 
households affect the value of household assets and have an impact 
on consumption: 
Financial and Real Estate Markets   →
Household Assets   →   Consumption 
The CCA models for the household sector could provide useful 
insights into household behavior regarding consumption, especially 
how consumption changes with household asset volatility (and higher 
moments of the household asset distribution). This is because the 
CCA captures non-linearities in the value of household debt and in 
the changes in consumption. 
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3.1.7 Nonlinear risk transmission between sectors through 
implicit put options
Risk is transmitted across the sectors and balance sheets 
through implicit put options in risky debt and guarantees. Risky 
debt contains an implicit put option. If this risky debt is linked to 
the asset of another sector (for example, through loans from the 
financial sector), the risky debt of the second sector (in this case, 
banks) becomes a function of the implicit put option of the first 
sector. In other words it is a compound put option. The compound 
nature of the implicit put options of interlinked sectors creates the 
potential for highly nonlinear risk transmission. An illustration is 
provided in box 2. 
The dynamics of the interlinked CCA risk-adjusted balance 
sheets provide useful insights into the asymmetric nature of value 
changes and risk transmission in business cycle expansions versus 
contractions. In a situation of rapid economic growth, asset and 
equity values on balance sheets trend upward. A stress event 
somewhere in the system can set off a chain reaction of defaults as 
the implicit put options are exercised. The compound nature of the 
implicit put options can cause a sudden sharp decline in the value of 
risky debt or a sharp increase in implicit guarantees. There is thus 
an asymmetry in the change in values in the stress or crisis period 
vis-à-vis the smoother rate of change in the build-up phase of the 
business cycle.
Box 2. Highly Nonlinear Risk Exposures from 
Interlinked Sectors
The risky debt of sector one, S1, is the default-free value of debt 
minus an implicit put option, which we assume is the asset of sector two, 
S2, that is, ( ) B P A
S S S 1 1 2 - = . In sector two, the assets are equal to equity 
plus risky debt, A E B P
S S S S 2 2 2 2 = + - ( ). If we combine these equations and 
rearrange, we see that the implicit put option, that is, the present value 
of expected losses associated with the debt of S2, is a function of the 
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To illustrate this relationship, we look at bank loans to borrowers 
whose risky debt can be modeled as the default-free value of the loan 
minus an implicit put option (derived from the borrower’s asset level, 
asset volatility, and leverage). The bank’s risk exposure derives from a 
compound put option, since it depends on the bank assets whose value 
depends on the borrower’s risky debt. This compound option can lead to 
highly nonlinear risk exposures. For example, suppose a bank’s assets 
consist entirely of risky debt to a corporate sector with promised payments 
of 100. Figure B1 illustrates how the value of the bank’s implicit put 
option increases as (i) the corporate sector debt-to asset-ratio increases; 
and (ii) the volatility of the corporate assets increases. 
Figure B1. Bank Expected Losses (Implicit Put Option) 
versus Corporate Sector Debt-to-Asset Ratio for High 
and Low Volatility of Corporate Assets
Source: Authors’ computation.
This means that the (absolute value) of the delta of the bank’s implicit 
put option is high when the volatility of corporate assets is high, and it 
is high even when the corporate debt-to-asset ratio is low. While this is 
just a stylized example, the nonlinear nature of the implicit put options 
was clearly evident in the Thailand crisis. There were high levels of 
foreign-currency-denominated debt in the corporate sector in Thailand 
in 1996. In 1997, devaluation, combined with a decline in the stock 
market and increased volatility, led to widespread bankruptcies, which 
transmitted risk to bank balance sheets and to the government via the 
implicit guarantee. The implicit government guarantee to the banking 
system was 3 percent of GDP in 1996 and increased to over 35 percent 
of GDP following the 1997 devaluation (Gray, 2001).144 Dale F. Gray, Robert C. Merton, and Zvi Bodie
3.2 Balance Sheet Risk Framework for Stress Testing, 
Scenario, and Simulation Analysis
The economywide CCA model can be used with scenario, 
simulation, and stress-testing analysis. There are different levels 
of sectoral aggregation, which range from the simple four sector 
model described here to a model with several corporate subsectors, 
a disaggregation of the household sector by income groups, and 
several financial sector divisions. The level of aggregation depends 
on practical issues related to data availability, data reliability, and 
the goals of the analysis. By simulating shocks to key variables, one 
can see how the CCA risk indicators and implicit put and call options 
are affected in other sectors. 
The structure and aggregation of CCA models can be designed 
to analyze risk in major financial institutions for financial stability 
analysis. Since distress in one major institution can affect systemic 
stability, it makes sense to try to model the risk for major institutions 
individually and group smaller financial institutions to keep the 
model size manageable. 
There are different ways to link these financial institutions to 
other sectors and to macroeconomic variables and use the model for 
stress testing. Some examples are described below.
3.2.1 Financial stability stress testing with CCA, factor, and 
macroeconomic models 
First, a CCA model is calibrated for each major financial 
institution  (or  groups  of  institutions)  using  equity  market 
information, and the time series of implied assets and risk indicators 
is calculated (calibration can be done using the Merton Model, 
Hull’s implementation of the Merton Model, or another CCA model). 
The time pattern of asset returns of each financial institution (or 
of the risk indicators) can be used as the dependent variable in a 
factor model. Key factors driving these asset returns could include 
gross domestic product (GDP), domestic and foreign interest rates, 
the exchange rate, domestic and foreign equity indices, and so on. 
A separate macroeconomic scenario generating model, such as a 
macroeconomic VAR or GVAR model,16 could then be used to test 
the impact of the scenarios on the key factors, which feed into the 
16. Hoggarth, Sorensen, and Zicchino (2005) discuss the use of VAR models for 
stress testing. Pesaran, Schuermann, and Wiener (2004) and Castrén, Dees, and Zaher 
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financial institution’s assets. This, in turn, affects the credit risk 
indicators and the value of equity capital.17 
This stress-testing process can be summarized in four steps. 
Macroeconomic scenarios are generated with a VAR, GVAR model, 
or other model (step 1).18 The scenarios are then used in the factor 
model for the bank’s assets (step 2). The factor model provides the 
basis for estimating the impact of the scenarios on the bank’s assets 
and its credit risk (implicit put option) (step 3) and on the bank’s 
equity capital (step 4).
3.2.2 Banking stability stress testing with links to the 
corporate and household sectors 
Given sufficient data on corporate and household sector balance 
sheets, the previous approach can be modified to first calibrate the 
CCA models for key financial institutions (as before) and calibrate 
the corporate and household sector CCA balance sheets. The next 
step is to use data on banks’ exposure to various subsectors to 
provide the links between bank assets and the risky debt obligations 
of the borrowers. Risk is transmitted by the changing value of the 
implicit put options in the borrower’s risky debt. A factor model 
could be estimated for the time series of corporate and household 
sector assets returns and used in conjunction with macroeconomic 
scenarios similar to the approach described earlier.19
3.2.3 Stress testing and capital adequacy assessment using 
CCA models of financial institutions 
One major goal of financial sector stress testing is to assess the 
capital adequacy of various institutions under different potential 
shocks. Shocks to financial institution assets and asset volatility or 
to interest rates and other parameters can be used in the CCA model 
to measure the impact on capital adequacy. An advantage of using 
CCA models for financial institutions is that the capital adequacy can 
be related to asset level, asset volatility, and default probability on 
17. The model used by Gray and Walsh (2008) is similar to this approach. See also 
Gray and Jones (2006).
18. The structural CCA model is a useful framework for understanding the 
comovements of assets, equity, credit risk, and key volatility measures. It could provide 
useful insights for structuring VAR models and designing shocks or innovations in 
those models.
19. Van den End and Tabbae (2005) use CCA balance sheet models and suggest 
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the institution’s liabilities and other factors.  Van Deventer and Imai 
(1997, 2003) and Belmont (2004) extend this method of calculating 
capital adequacy to include interest rates, interest rate volatility, 
and the correlation of asset returns with interest rates, using the 
Merton-STV model. 
The financial stress tests commonly used by central banks and 
banking supervisors incorporate various models to measure the 
change in the expected default probability of the obligors, usually 
representative corporations or corporate subsectors. The default 
probabilities are then used with estimates of exposure and loss given 
default in a model of bank credit losses (such as Credit Risk Plus) to 
estimate the impact on economic capital.20 Calibrated CCA models 
of financial institutions can be used to estimate capital adequacy 
without the need for detailed data on default probabilities or loss 
given default of obligors. As pointed out by van Deventer and Imai, 
“In the capital allocation [using the Merton-STV model], note that 
we didn’t use the probability of default or the loss given default 
in allocating capital. We don’t need to, because the probability of 
default and loss given default are both implied by the STV model 
and the value of asset volatility and interest rate and correlation” 
(van Deventer and Imai, 2003, p. 221). This makes CCA a potentially 
useful tool when detailed data on obligor exposures, default 
probabilities, or loss given default are not available.
3.3 Integrating Financial Risk Models and Indicators 
with Macroeconomic Models
Even state-of-the-art macroeconomic models generally leave 
out credit risk and the market risk of the claims held in agents’ 
financial portfolios. This omission can be serious, because risk affects 
valuation, and changes in the valuation of agents’ claims, and thus 
of their net worth, affects their decisions to spend, save, and invest. 
Recent work has begun to address the linkage of macroeconomic and 
financial stability models.21 
20. See Sorge (2004). Castrén, Dees, and Zaher (2007) at the European Central 
Bank use the Moody’s KMV median default probability for various corporate sectors 
with a vector autoregression (VAR) or global VAR. See also Pesaran, Schuermann, and 
Wiener (2004) and Alves (2005).
21. See Bardsen, Lindquist, and Tsomocos (2006), Goodhart, Sunirand, and 
Tsomocos (2004, 2006a, 2006b), Tsomocos (2003), Haldane, Hall, and Pezzini (2007), 
Swinburne (2007), and IMF (2007). 147 Measuring and Managing Macrofinancial Risk
To understand the interaction of balance sheet risk and 
the macroeconomy, a promising area of future research is the 
integration of the financial risk analytic models and indicators with 
traditional macroeconomic models. Such integrated models need 
to address the different mathematical nature of macroeconomic 
models and finance models. Macroeconomic models are primarily 
stock-flow models in discrete time and are usually geared to 
forecasting the mean of macroeconomic variables. Financial risk 
analytics, on the other hand, focus on the probability that assets, 
following a random walk, will fall below a certain threshold or 
default barrier, such that volatility (the second moment) rather 
than the mean (first moment) is the critical element in risk 
analysis. The CCA framework centers on volatile assets relative to 
a distress barrier, using option pricing concepts to calculate credit 
risk indicators. While there can be different levels of aggregation 
of the CCA balance sheets, whatever level of aggregation is chosen, 
the time pattern of the following could be calculated and used with 
macroeconomic models: 
—Time series of CCA balance sheet components (namely, assets, 
asset volatility, distress barriers, and implicit put and call options) 
and sensitivity measures (such as delta and vega);
—Time series of CCA-derived credit risk indicators (including 
distance to distress, estimated default probability, and CCA credit 
spreads) (see box 3 for ways to aggregate credit risk indicators); and
—Time series of market indicators such as observed CDS and bond 
spreads or market risk appetite indicators (for example, VIX).
These financial risk analytic measures can be related to the time 
pattern of macroeconomic variables using econometric techniques to 
study leads, lags, or contemporaneous correlation. Various channels 
could be investigated using econometrics. For example, the channel 
from GDP to corporate and household risk indicators and then to 
financial sector risk indicators could be modeled. The reverse channel 
from the financial sector (balance sheets and risk indicators) to the 
corporate and household sector balance sheet components and to 
risk indicators, and the relationship to GDP over the economic cycle, 
could similarly be investigated.22 
22. The dynamics of corporate and household borrowing levels are directly related 
to distress barriers in the CCA model.148 Dale F. Gray, Robert C. Merton, and Zvi Bodie
Box 3. Aggregation of Credit Risk Indicators (CRIs) 
The CCA credit risk indicators of a portfolio of individual financial 
institutions (or corporate firms) must be aggregated to provide a 
tractable measure of system risk for use with macroeconomic models 
and for financial stability analysis. There are several ways to measure 
the system risk by aggregating the risk indicators of individual banks 
or institutions. 
—Weight the individual default probabilities (that is, the EDFs from 
Moody’s KMV or other default probability estimate) by the implied assets 
of each bank or financial institution to get a system risk indicator. 
—Weight the distance to distress for each institution by the 
implied assets of each bank or financial institution to get a system risk 
indicator. 
—Use the median EDF for the subsector or group, for example, as 
calculated by Moody’s KMV.
—Sum the implicit put options of a portfolio of institutions to calculate 
the system expected loss for a given horizon. 
—Calculate an Nth-to-default indicator: the time pattern of default 
risk indicators for a portfolio of individual financial institutions can be 
used to understand the default correlations and get a credit risk indicator 
that is the probability of N defaults over a specific horizon.
—Calculate the joint distribution of default probabilities in a portfolio 
of financial institutions,  such as the joint probability modeled with 
the portfolio multivariate density developed by Segoviano (2006) and 
Segoviano, Goodhart, and Hofmann (2006).
3.4 Financial Risk Analytic Indicators and Monetary 
Policy Models
Financial stability models and monetary stability models, by 
their nature, are very different frameworks. There is keen interest in 
relating these two types of analysis, but no consensus on how it can be 
done. The primary tool for macroeconomic management is the interest 
rates set by the central bank. Simple model-based monetary policy 
models are widely used by central banks to understand macroeconomic 
and interest rate relationships.23 A simple four module monetary 
policy model of this type consists of an equation for the GDP output 
gap, an equation for inflation, an equation for the exchange rate and 
real interest rates, and a Taylor rule for setting the domestic policy 
23. Berg, Karam, and Laxton (2006a, 2006b) provide a good summary.149 Measuring and Managing Macrofinancial Risk
rate. The domestic policy rate is a short-term interest rate set by the 
central bank, such as the Federal funds rate in the United States. 
Since the economy and interest rates affect financial sector credit 
risk, and the financial sector affects the economy, an important issue 
is whether credit risk indicators (or CRIs, described in box 3) should 
be included in monetary policy models and, if so, how. Including an 
aggregate credit risk indicator in the GDP gap equation and testing 
whether or not the coefficient is an important first step toward a better 
understanding of how financial sector credit risk affects GDP. The next 
step could be to add a fifth equation relating the CRIs to GDP and 
interest rates (possibly drawing on analysis from the previous section 
relating financial risk indicators to macroeconomic variables). 
Past data could be used to include the CRI in the policy rate 
reaction function, to examine whether financial stability was taken 
into account when setting interest rates in the past. A variation of 
this approach is being investigated in the research department of the 
Central Bank of Chile.24 The approach taken in the Central Bank of 
Chile is to first estimate the distance to distress for the banking system 
(each individual bank’s distance to distress, from a CCA model that 
is weighted by bank implied assets). The banking system’s distance 
to distress is included in the GDP gap equation and in the policy rate 
reaction function. The model parameters are then estimated using 
historical data, including the distance-to-distress indicator. This 
approach can be used to examine the tradeoffs between GDP, inflation, 
and the banking system’s distance to distress.25 
Outputs of the sovereign CCA model include an estimate of the 
risk premium on government local currency debt, which is embedded 
in the nominal interest rate. This, in turn, affects the exchange rate, 
which is part of the GDP gap and inflation equations (the first and 
second equations in the simple monetary policy model). This issue 
is important for certain emerging market countries (such as Brazil 
and Turkey).26 These are promising areas for further research.27  
24. See Gray, García, Luna, and Restrepo (in this volume).
25. A related issue is whether an indicator of market risk appetite such as the VIX 
should be included in monetary policy models along with the credit risk indicator. This 
could help estimate the impact of the credit risk indicator on the GDP gap, adjusted 
for changes in risk appetite. 
26. See Gray and Malone (2008) and Favero and Giavazzi (2003).
27. Other interesting routes for linking risk analytics more closely with 
macroeconomic models include incorporating default risk and a risk premium into the 
Mundell-Fleming model to separate out the effects of changes in interest rates due to 
changes in the market for liquidity and changes in interest rates due to changes in the 
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A final point involves the feedback of monetary policy and 
changes in interest rates on the CCA balance sheet values and risk 
indicators. CCA models that incorporate changes in interest rates 
(such as the Merton-STV model or the factor model for asset return 
with interest rates as one factor) can be used to estimate the second 
round effects on the credit risk of financial institutions in response 
to changes in interest rates. 
4. ConClusions 
This paper proposes a new approach to improve the way central 
banks analyze and manage the financial risks of a national economy. 
It is based on the modern theory and practice of contingent claims 
analysis (CCA), which is successfully used today at the level of 
individual banks by managers, investors, and regulators. The basic 
analytical tool is the risk-adjusted balance sheet, which shows the 
sensitivity of the enterprise’s assets and liabilities to external shocks. 
The sectors of an economy are viewed as interconnected portfolios of 
assets, liabilities, and guarantees—some explicit and others implicit. 
The CCA approach is well-suited to capturing such nonlinearities 
and to quantifying the effects of asset-liability mismatches within 
and across institutions. Risk-adjusted CCA balance sheets facilitate 
simulations and stress testing to evaluate the potential impact of 
policies to manage systemic risk. The time pattern of CCA balance 
sheet components, risk indicators, and sensitivity parameters can be 
integrated with macroeconomic models. Finally, the paper explored 
the inclusion of financial system risk indicators and other financial 
risk parameters in simple monetary policy models. 151 Measuring and Managing Macrofinancial Risk
aPPendix 
This appendix provides details on estimating implied assets and 
asset volatility, and extensions of the Merton Model. 
A1. Calculating Implied Assets and Implied Asset 
Volatility 
The value of assets is unobservable, but it can be implied using 
CCA. In the Merton Model for firms, banks and nonbank financial 
institutions with traded equity use equity, J, equity volatility, σj, and 
the distress barrier in the following two equations to solve for the 
two unknowns A, asset value, and σA, asset volatility (see Crouhy, 
Galai, and Mark, 2000).
J A N d BN d = ( )- ( ) 0 1 2
and 
J A N d J A σ σ = ( ) 1 .
A2. Extensions of the Merton Model
Numerous extensions of the original Merton Model have been 
developed that relax certain assumptions in the original model. 
Restrictions of the model include the assumptions that: (i) default 
can occur only at the maturity date of the debt; (ii) there is a fixed 
default barrier; (iii) there is a constant risk-free rate; and (iv) asset 
volatility is constant. Cossin and Pirotte (2001) provide a good 
summary of extensions of the Merton Model. Black and Cox (1976) 
extend the Merton Model to relax the assumptions (i) and (ii) above 
by introducing a first-passage-time model where default can occur 
prior to the maturity of the debt if the asset falls below a specified 
barrier function for the first time. 
Although the strict theoretical condition in the Merton Model for 
default is that the value of assets is less than the required payments 
due on the debt, in the real world, default typically occurs at much 
higher asset values, either because of a material breach of a debt 
covenant or because assets cannot be sold to meet the payments 
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to default and induce a debt renegotiation rather than sell assets. 
To capture these real-world conditions for default in the model, we 
specify a market value of total assets at which default occurs. We 
call this level of assets that trigger default the distress barrier. 
This barrier can be viewed as the present value of the promised 
payments discounted at the risk-free rate. The approach used in 
the KMV model sets the barrier level equal to the sum of the book 
value of short-term debt, promised interest payments for the next 
12 months, and half of long-term debt (see Crouhy, Galai, and Mark, 
2000; Crosbie, 1999, 2001). 
In the 1990s, the KMV model was based the Vasicek-Kealhofer 
(VK) model, which has multiple layers of liabilities and several 
confidential features. Moody’s KMV’s expected default frequency 
(EDF) credit measure is calculated using an iterative procedure 
to solve for the asset volatility. This distance to distress was then 
mapped to actual default probabilities using a database of detailed 
real-world default probabilities for many firms. The Moody’s KMV 
distance to distress and the cumulative expected default probabilities 























CEDF f DD t KMV t =   ( ) .
This definition of DDKMV includes the real drift of the asset, µA, 
whereas the distance to distress from the Merton approach has r 
for the asset drift. Since Moody’s KMV estimates the actual default 
probabilities, the risk-neutral default probabilities are calculated 
from the correlation of the implied asset with the market, the market 
Sharpe Ratio, and time horizon. 
The CreditGrades (2002) model includes a diffusion of a firm’s 
assets and a first-passage-time default with a stochastic default 
barrier. The model was modified to incorporate equity derivatives 
(Stamicar and Finger, 2005). Hull, Nelken, and White (2004) study 
the relationship between the volatility skew implied by equity options 
and CDS spreads. They establish a relationship between implied 
volatility of two equity options, leverage, and asset volatility. This 
approach is, in fact, another way of implementing Merton’s model to 153 Measuring and Managing Macrofinancial Risk
get spreads and risk-neutral default probabilities directly from the 
implied volatility of equity options. Zou (2003) discusses a similar 
approach using several equity options. 
The Merton Model has been extended to include stochastic 
interest rates, as well. Shimko, Tejima, and van Deventer (1993) 
include a Vasicek interest rate term structure model that relaxes 
assumption (iii) above, allowing the risk-free interest rate to change 
and including the correlation of asset return with the interest rate. 
There are two stochastic factors, the asset and the interest rate. 
This closed-form model, which is frequently called the STV model, 
is a very useful extension because it includes the impact of changing 
interest rate term structures. Longstaff and Schwartz (1995) take 
the Black and Cox (1976) model and add in stochastic interest rates, 
similar to the way the STV model includes interest rates. 154 Dale F. Gray, Robert C. Merton, and Zvi Bodie
RefeRenCes 
Alves, I. 2005. “Sectoral Fragility: Factors and Dynamics.” BIS papers 
22: 450–80. Basel: Bank for International Settlements.
Bardsen, G., K.G. Lindquist, and D.P. Tsomocos. 2006. “Evaluation of 
Macroeconomic Models for Financial Stability Analysis.” Working 
paper 2006/01. Oslo: Central Bank of Norway, Financial Markets 
Department.
Belmont, D. 2004. Value Added Risk Management in Financial 
Institutions. Hoboken, N.J.: John Wiley and Sons.
Berg, A., P. Karam, and D. Laxton. 2006a. “A Practical Model-Based 
Approach to Monetary and Policy Analysis: How-to Guide.” Working 
paper 06/81. Washington: International Monetary Fund.
. 2006b. “A Practical Model-Based Approach to Monetary and 
Policy Analysis: Overview.” Working paper 06/80. Washington: 
International Monetary Fund. 
Bernanke, B.S., M. Gertler, and S. Gilchrist. 1999. “The Financial 
Accelerator in a Quantitative Business Cycle Framework.” In 
Handbook of Macroeconomics, vol. 1, edited by J.B. Taylor and   
M. Woodford, pp. 1341–93. Amsterdam: Elsevier Science.
Black, F. and J. Cox. 1976. “Valuing Corporate Securities: Some 
Effects of Bond Indenture Provisions.” Journal of Finance 31(2): 
351–67.
Black, F. and M. Scholes. 1973. “The Pricing of Options and Corporate 
Liabilities.” Journal of Political Economy 81(3): 637–54.
Bodie, Z. 2006. “On Asset-Liability Matching and Federal Deposit 
and Pension Insurance.” Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review 
(July): 323–30.
Bodie, Z. and R.C. Merton. 2000. Finance. Upper Saddle River, N.J.: 
Prentice Hall. 
Castrén, O., S. Dees, and F. Zaher. 2007. “How Do Global Macro-Financial 
Shocks Affect Corporate Sector Expected Default Frequencies in the 
Euro Area?” Frankfurt: European Central Bank. 
Cossin, D. and H. Pirotte. 2001. Advanced Credit Risk Analysis. 
Hoboken, N.J.: John Wiley and Sons.
CreditGrades. 2002. “CreditGrades Technical Document.” New York: 
RiskMetrics Group.
Crosbie, P.J. 1999. “Modeling Default Risk.” San Francisco, Calif.: 
KMV Corporation.
. 2001. “Modeling Default Risk.” San Francisco, Calif.: KMV 
Corporation.155 Measuring and Managing Macrofinancial Risk
Crouhy, M., D. Galai, and R. Mark. 2000. Risk Management. New 
York: McGraw Hill.
Draghi, M., F. Giavazzi, and R.C. Merton. 2003. Transparency, Risk 
Management, and International Financial Fragility, vol. 4. Geneva 
Reports on the World Economy. Geneva: International Center for 
Monetary and Banking Studies. 
Favero, C. and F. Giavazzi. 2003. “Monetary Policy When Debt and 
Default Risk Are High: Lessons from Brazil.” Seminar paper. 
London School of Economics, Centre for Economic Performance. 
Available online at http://cep.lse.ac.uk/seminarpapers/22-05-03-
GIA.pdf. 
Gapen, M.T., D.F. Gray, C.H. Lim, and Y. Xiao. 2004. “The Contingent 
Claims Approach to Corporate Vulnerability Analysis: Estimating 
Default Risk and Economy-wide Risk Transfer.” Working paper 
04/121 Washington: International Monetary Fund.
. 2008. “Measuring and Analyzing Sovereign Risk with 
Contingent Claims.” IMF Staff Papers 55(1): 109–48. 
Goodhart, C.A.E., P. Sunirand, and D.P. Tsomocos. 2004. “A Model to 
Analyse Financial Fragility: Applications.” Journal of Financial 
Stability 1(1): 1–30.
. 2006a. “A Model to Analyse Financial Fragility.” Economic 
Theory 27(1): 107–42.
. 2006b. “A Time Series Analysis of Financial Fragility in the 
U.K. Banking System.” Annals of Finance 2(1): 1–21.
Gray, D.F. 2001. “Macro Financial Risk Country Report: Thailand, 
MFRisk and Macro Financial Risk Framework.” MFRisk 
document.
Gray, D.F. and M. Jones. 2006. “Measuring Sovereign and Banking 
Risk in Indonesia: An Application of the Contingent Claims 
Approach.” In Indonesia: Selected Issues Paper, country report 
06/318, chap. 3. Washington: International Monetary Fund. 
Gray, D.F., C.H. Lim, E. Loukoianova, and S. Malone. 2008. “A Risk-
Based Debt Sustainability Framework: Incorporating Balance 
Sheets and Uncertainty.” Working paper 08/40. Washington: 
International Monetary Fund. 
Gray, D.F. and S. Malone. 2008. Macrofinancial Risk Analysis. 
Hoboken, N.J.: John Wiley and Sons. 
Gray, D.F., R.C. Merton, and Z. Bodie. 2002. “A New Framework for 
Analyzing and Managing Macrofinancial Risks.” Paper prepared 
for the Conference on Finance and the Macroeconomy. New York 
University, 11–12 October.156 Dale F. Gray, Robert C. Merton, and Zvi Bodie
. 2006. “A New Framework for Analyzing and Managing 
Macrofinancial Risks of an Economy.” Working paper 12637. 
Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research.
. 2007. “Contingent Claims Approach to Measuring and 
Managing Sovereign Credit Risk.” Journal of Investment 
Management 5(4): 1–24.
Gray, D. F. and J. Walsh. 2008. “Factor Model for Stress Testing with a 
Contingent Claims Model of the Chilean Banking System.” Working 
paper 08/89. Washington: International Monetary Fund.
Haldane, A., S. Hall, and S. Pezzini. 2007. “A New Approach to 
Assessing Risks to Financial System Stability.” Financial stability 
paper 2. London: Bank of England. 
Hoggarth, G., S. Sorensen, and L. Zicchino. 2005. “Stress tests of U.K. 
banks using a VAR approach.” Working paper 282. London: Bank 
of England. 
Hull, J., I. Nelken, and A. White. 2004. “Merton’s Model, Credit Risk, 
and Volatility Skews.” Journal of Credit Risk 1(1): 3–28.
IMF (International Monetary Fund). 2007. Global Financial Stability 
Report: Financial Market Turbulence Causes, Consequences, and 
Policies. Washington.
Longstaff, F. and E.S. Schwartz. 1995. “A Simple Approach to Valuing 
Risky Fixed and Floating Rate Debt.” Journal of Finance 50(3): 
789–819.
Merton, R.C. 1973. “Theory of Rational Option Pricing.” Bell Journal 
of Economics 4(1): 141–83. Reprinted in Continuous-Time Finance, 
chap. 8, 1992, Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 
. 1974. “On the Pricing of Corporate Debt: The Risk Structure 
of Interest Rates.” Journal of Finance 29(2): 449–70. Reprinted 
in Continuous-Time Finance, chap. 12, 1992, Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell.
. 1977. “An Analytic Derivation of the Cost of Deposit 
Insurance and Loan Guarantees: An Application of Modern Option 
Pricing Theory.” Journal of Banking and Finance 1(1): 3–11. 
Reprinted in Continuous-Time Finance, chap. 19, 1992, Oxford: 
Basil Blackwell.
. 1992. Continuous-Time Finance. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
. 1998. “Applications of Option-Pricing Theory: Twenty-Five 
Years Later.” Les Prix Nobel 1997. Stockholm: Nobel Foundation. 
Reprinted in American Economic Review 88(3): 323–49.
Merton, R.C. and Z. Bodie. 1992. “On the Management of Financial 
Guarantees.” Financial Management 21(4): 87–109.157 Measuring and Managing Macrofinancial Risk
Pesaran, M., T. Schuermann, and S. Wiener. 2004. “Modelling 
Regional Interdependencies Using a Global Error-Correcting 
Macroeconometric Model.” Journal of Business and Econmic 
Statistics 22 (April): 129–62.
Segoviano, M.A. 2006. “Portfolio Credit Risk and Macroeconomic 
Shocks: Applications to Stress Testing under Data-Restricted 
Environments.” Working paper 06/283. Washington: International 
Monetary Fund.
Segoviano, M.A., C.A.E. Goodhart, and B. Hofmann. 2006. “Default, 
Credit Growth, and Asset Prices.” Working paper 06/223. 
Washington: International Monetary Fund.
Shimko, D., N. Tejima, and D. van Deventer. 1993. “The Pricing of 
Risky Debt When Interest Rates Are Stochastic.” Journal of Fixed 
Income 3(2): 58–65.
Sorge, M. 2004. “Stress Testing Financial Systems: An Overview 
of Current Methodologies.” Working paper 165. Basel: Bank for 
International Settlements.
Stamicar, R. and C. Finger. 2005. “Incorporating Equity Options into 
the CreditGrades Model.” New York: RiskMetrics Group.
Swinburne, M. 2007. “The IMF’s Experience with Macro Stress 
Testing.” Paper prepared for the High-Level Conference on 
Simulating Financial Instability. European Central Bank, 
Frankfurt, 12–13 July.
Tsomocos, D.P. 2003. ‘Equilibrium Analysis, Banking, and Financial 
Instability.” Journal of Mathematical Economics 39(5–6): 619–
55.
Van den End, W. and M. Tabbae. 2005. “Measuring Financial Stability: 
Applying the MFRisk Model to the Netherlands.” Working paper 
30. Amsterdam: Netherlands Central Bank.
Van Deventer, D. and K. Imai. 1997. Financial Risk Analytics. New 
York: McGraw-Hill. 
. 2003. Credit Risk Models and the Basel Accords. Hoboken, 
N.J.: John Wiley and Sons.
Zou, J. 2003. “The Relationship between Credit Default Probability and 
Equity Options Volatility Surface.” Paper presented at the Ninth 
Annual RISK USA Conference. Risk Magazine, Boston, June. 